

Message Text

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FOR AF/C JUNIOR FROM DOUBLEDAY

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PFOR, AO
SUBJECT: ANGOLA AFTER NETO

1. IN VIEW OF CONTINUING UNCERTAINTY SURROUNDING NETO'S
HEALTH AND WHEREABOUTS, AND SINCE I WILL BE AWAY FOR ANOTHER
TWO WEEKS, THOUGHT YOU MIGHT FIND USEFUL THE FOLLOWING
THOUGHTS ON WHITHER ANGOLA AFTER NETO.

2. IF NETO WERE TO LEAVE THE SCENE NOW, THE MPLA-LABOR
PARTY WOULD PROBABLY UNDERGO A POWER STRUGGLE BETWEEN
ITS LONG-TIME, MULATTO-DOMINATED UPPER-LEVEL OFFICIALS
AND YOUNGER, PREDOMINANTLY MILITARY, BLACK RADICALS.
AFTER NETO, THE LEADING OLD-LINE MPLA OFFICIAL IS MPLA
SECRETARY LUCIO LARA (ULATTO), WHO, WHILE MPLA'S LEADING
MARXIST THEORETICIAN AND BELIEVED FRIENDLY TO THE SOVIET
UNION, IS ALSO THOUGHT TO ESPOUSE NONALIGNMENT AND THE
MAINTENANCE OF AS MUCH FREEDOM OF ACTION AS POSSIBLE FOR
ANGOLA VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS. WHATEVER LARA'S
PREFERENCES, HOWEVER, HIS FREEDOM OF MANEUVER IS LIKELY
TO BE EVEN LESS THAN NETO'S IS AT PRESENT. ONE REASON
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FOR THIS IS THAT THE REMAINING "MODERATES" IN THE ANGOLAN
GOVERNMENT, MOST PROMINENTLY FOREIGN MINISTER PAULO
JORGE, OWE THEIR PRESENT POSITION LARGELY TO THEIR
RELATIONSHIP WITH NETO, AND WOULD THEREFORE PROBABLY NOT
REMAIN IN THE GOVERNMENT VERY LONG AFTER NETO'S PASSING.
THIS WOULD SWING THE CENTER OF GRAVITY IN THE MPLA
FURTHER TOWARD THE PRO-SOVIET DIRECTION.

3. OTHER TOP MPLA FIGURES WHO MIGHT BE EXPECTED TO SIDE WITH LARA IN ANY POWER STRUGGLE INCLUDE FIRST DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER JOSE EDUARDO DOS SANTOS (BLACK, WITH RUSSIAN WIFE); SECOND DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER CARLOS ROCHA AKA DILOLWA (MULATTO); AND DEFENSE MINISTER HENRIQUE "IKO" CARREIRA (MULATTO). LARA HAS NEVER HELD A GOVERNMENT POSITION, AND IF HE WERE TO WIN OUT IN A CONFRONTATION, MIGHT PREFER TO REMAIN IN THE BACKGROUND WITH DOS SANTOS, ROCHA, CARREIRA, OR SOMEONE ELSE AS PRESIDENT. ANY OF THESE THREE COULD, ON THE OTHER HAND, DECIDE TO THROW IN THEIR LOT WITH THE YOUNGER RADICALS IF THEY CONSIDER THE LATTER LIKELY TO WIN; BUT HOW MUCH INFLUENCE THEY COULD EXPECT TO WIELD IN A RADICAL-DOMINATED REGIME IS OPEN TO QUESTION (ALTHOUGH DOS SANTOS, BEING BLACK, MIGHT FARE BETTER THAN THE OTHER TWO). IT IS ALSO A QUESTION WHETHER CARREIRA WOULD BE ABLE TO BRING THE MILITARY ALONG WITH HIM IN SUPPORT OF LARA.

4. THE YOUNGER, PREDOMINANTLY MILITARY BLACK RADICALS DEMONSTRATED THEIR GROWING INFLUENCE IN THE MPLA DURING THE DECEMBER 1977 MPLA CONGRESS. ONE LEADER AROUND WHOM THESE RADICALS MIGHT COALESCE IN A POWER STRUGGLE IS FAPLA (ARMED FORCES) CHIEF OF STAFF JAO LUIS NETO (NO KNOWN RELATION TO PRESIDENT NETO), WHO, HAVING LIMITED EDUCATION, COULD BE MORE EASILY MANIPULATED BY

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THE SOVIETS THAN COULD SOMEONE LIKE LARA. THIS YOUNGER GROUP, IN ITS MILITARY ORIENTATION AND ITS RESENTMENT OF MULATTO DOMINATION IN MPLA, BEARS RESEMBLANCE TO THE FORCES LED BY NITO ALVES WHICH STAGED THE UNSUCCESSFUL COUP ATTEMPT AGAINST NETO IN MAY 1977--AN UPRISING WHICH IS WIDELY BELIEVED TO HAVE HAD SOVIET BACKING. ALTHOUGH THE CUBANS SAVED NETO IN MAY 1977, IT DOES NOT NECESSARILY FOLLOW THAT THEY WILL TAKE THE MORE MODERATE SIDE IN A FUTURE POWER STRUGGLE. (THEIR SUPPORT OF NETO ON THAT OCCASION MAY HAVE BEEN DUE TO THE UPRISING HAVING TAKEN PLACE PREMATURELY, BEFORE ALL THE GROUNDWORK HAD BEEN LAID.) THEY WOULD BE MORE LIKELY TO SUPPORT THE YOUNGER GROUP, WHICH IS MORE MILITARILY ORIENTED AS WELL AS MORE EASILY INFLUENCED.

5. STILL ANOTHER ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT ENTITY WHICH WOULD PLAY A MAJOR ROLE, BUT WHOSE LEANINGS ARE DIFFICULT TO PREDICT, IS DISA, THE SECRET POLICE. BOTH DISA'S DIRECTOR (RODRIGUES JAO LOPES, AKA LUDY) AND ITS DEPUTY DIRECTOR (HENRIQUE DE CARVALHO SANTOS, AKA ONANBWE) ARE MULATTO, WHICH MIGHT CAUSE THEM TO SIDE WITH LARA. ON THE OTHER HAND, ONAMBWE WAS TRAINED IN CUBA AND IS

REPORTED TO BE CLOSE TO THE CUBANS. MOREOVER, DISA IS REPORTED TO HAVE A LARGE CONTINGENT OF CUBAN AS WELL AS EAST GERMAN ADVISERS. IT MAY THUS BE CONCLUDED THAT DISA WILL NOT AUTOMATICALLY LINE UP WITH LARA AND HIS SUPPORTERS, AND THAT IT IS IN FACT MORE LIKELY TO SIDE WITH THE RADICALS.

6. IN ANY CASE, THE POST-NETO OUTLOOK FOR U.S. INTERESTS DOES NOT APPEAR PROMISING. WE ARE LIKELY TO FACE EITHER A RADICAL, MILITARY-DOMINATED GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD HAVE LITTLE INTEREST IN KEEPING OPEN AN OPTION TO THE WEST, OR ELSE A GOVERNMENT OF THE OLD LINE LEADERS, INCLUDING LARA, WHICH WOULD PROBABLY WANT TO MAINTAIN SUCH AN OPTION BUT WHOSE ABILITY TO DO SO WOULD BE MORE CIRCUM-CONFIDENTIAL

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SCRIBED THAN EVER. CUBA WOULD BE NO MORE LIKELY TO REDUCE ITS FORCES THAN IT IS NOW--IN FACT, POST-NETO INSTABILITY WOULD GIVE THE CUBANS A FURTHER EXCUSE TO REMAIN. THE FOREIGN MINISTRY IN PARTICULAR WOULD LIKELY BECOME LESS INTERESTED IN RELATIONS WITH THE WEST. ANGOLA'S RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. PRIVATE SECTOR MIGHT WELL BE AFFECTED FOR THE WORSE, NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF THE GENERAL SWING TO THE LEFT OF A NEW GOVERNMENT BUT ALSO BECAUSE SOME OF ANGOLA'S LEADING CONTACTS WITH U.S. BUSINESS--E.G., ANGOLAN DIRECTOR OF PETROLEUM, JORGE MORAIS AKA MONTE, WHO IS PRESIDENT NETO'S BROTHER-IN-LAW--WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE REMOVED. ON POSSIBLE BRIGHT SPOT WOULD BE THAT WITH NETO'S PASSING, ONE RPT ONE OBSTACLE TO RECONCILIATION BETWEEN MPLA AND UNITA--I.E., THE LONGSTANDING PERSONAL ANIMOSITY BETWEEN NETO AND SAVIMBI--WOULD BE GONE. ON THE OTHER HAND, A RADICAL, PREDOMINANTLY MILITARY GOVERNMENT MIGHT NOT BE INCLINED TOWARD ANYTHING BUT A MILITARY SOLUTION (WHICH WOULD HAVE NO CHANCE OF SUCCESS). GARDNER

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